Options on the outs by Doug Campbell
A
pril 27, 2004, was a good day at
RF Micro Devices Inc. On
that date, the Greensboro,
N.C., company reported its first full
year in the black since 2001. “We
turned the corner on profitability,”
CEO Bob Bruggeworth said in the
day’s press release.
RF Micro Devices was founded in
1991 by a small band of local engineers
and then built into a multinational
firm with offices in Silicon Valley and
China. The cellular phone compo-
nents market in which it competes is a
growing but tough business. Turning
the corner on profitability was wel-
come news indeed.
But there was no big move in RF
Micro’s stock price following the posi-
tive earnings report. As is the case
with most financial announcements, it
would have taken a big surprise for the
stock price to have been affected. In
fact, the market was already taking
into account something that RF
Micro wasn’t announcing that day —
looked at another way, the reported
$30 million profit was actually a loss of
$25 million.
This news wouldn’t officially come
until two months later in RF Micro’s
annual report, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The rea-
son for the difference between the
announced net income of $30 million
and the “pro forma” loss could be
found on page 28 of form 10-K in 
a footnote headed “Stock-Based
Compensation.” It showed that in RF
Micro’s latest fiscal year, the value of
stock options (and to a lesser extent,
certain outright stock awards) granted
to employees was costing the firm
about $62 million. Deducting that
amount from earnings (plus adding in
credit for a few other items) pushed
the firm into the red.
It wasn’t the first time RF Micro
had reported a profit when in an alter-
nate — some would say “economic” —
reality, it had lost money. The same
thing happened in 2001. And in every
other year of its existence, the firm’s
profits were actually lower than
reported because of stock option
grants, and its losses likewise larger.
This is not to say that RF Micro
was engaged in fraudulent behavior, or
even doing anything unusual for that
matter. Until this year, practically
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of a new accounting rule
BY DOUG CAMPBELL


























RF Fall Winter 07v42-sig3-INT  2/27/07  8:45 AM  Page 16every publicly traded firm in the coun-
try reported the cost of expensing
employee stock options in footnotes.
Scores would have reported losses
instead of profits if employee options
had been expensed. (In 1999, for
instance, the number of U.S. techno-
logy firms reporting losses would have
doubled if options had been deducted
from profits.) RF Micro Devices just
happens to be a good example of how
this process worked — and perhaps of
how managers tend to make decisions
based on accounting numbers instead
of economic ones.
To many, stock options in the 21st
century have become synonymous
with corporate greed. But that’s hyper-
bole which ignores some of the
positive things that options can do —
like align shareholder and employee
interests by motivating workers to
boost their company’s performance
and drive stock prices upward, for
starters. Stock options help compa-
nies like RF Micro grow faster than
they otherwise could have.
At the same time, many man-
agers and boards until recently
were seemingly blind to the true
costs of stock options, an anomaly
that economists are striving to
explain. And this unawareness had
a number of negative implications
for investors. Misjudging options
as much cheaper than cash, man-
agers were more likely to lavish them
on employees. Meanwhile, option
grants to top executives grew so wide-
spread that the average CEO today
makes about 262 times the average
employee. Perhaps the executives are
worth every dollar, or perhaps this is
what happens when a big chunk of
compensation gets accounted for as
virtually free. Finally, the recent scan-
dal over the practice of “backdating”
employee stock options may have
some of its roots in the relatively pain-
less way firms were allowed to account
for options.
Today, granting options is no longer
painless: 2006 is the first year that
public companies are being required to
subtract the cost of stock options
from their income. The change, which
was years in the making, came about 
in large part because of clamoring 
for corporate governance reforms.
Accounting scandals at Enron and
WorldCom gave the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
support for a long-proposed rule to
make stock option expensing manda-
tory, instead of something that since
1995 was relegated to footnotes in
annual company filings. (And before
1995, usually not reported at all.)
Across the nation, this one small
accounting change is affecting the 
use of employee stock options in a 
significant way. 
Stock Option Basics
Employee stock options represent the
right to buy a share of stock at a 
specified price — called the exercise
or strike price — before a specified
date. Unlike standard, short-lived “call
options,” employee options usually
cannot be sold to outside investors
(see sidebar, Google). Also, they tend
to have lengthier terms, sometimes of
up to 10 years, and usually include 
vesting periods.
Here is how it works. A firm issues
an option to an employee. The option
usually has an exercise price identical
to the price of the firm’s stock on the
day the option is issued. So if the stock
is trading at $10 on that day, the 
exercise price is also set at $10. If the
option vests in four years, then the
employee will have the right to buy a
share of stock four years later at $10,
no matter what the firm’s stock price is
at that future time. If the firm’s stock
price has doubled to $20, an employee
can buy that $20 share for just $10,
then immediately turn around and sell
it at the market price, pocketing the
$10 difference as profit.
The vesting period is the key to 
an option’s utility in retaining and
motivating employees. The idea is
that workers will perform at a higher
level so as to raise the stock price,
knowing that a higher price is in their
direct interest. At the same time,
other shareholders benefit — a seem-
ing resolution to the age-old agency
problem, aligning incentives of both
the owners and the agents. (As an
added bonus, the tax treatment for
stock options is less expensive 
compared with cash payments and
stock grants.)
Employee stock options were still
something of a rarity in 1972 when
a new rule was established to
require that companies treat
options as an expense as meas-
ured by their “intrinsic value” —
which is the difference between
the stock price when issued and
the exercise price. Thus, the
intrinsic value sets a lower bound
on the exercise price, and hence
its valuation. If the exercise price
is set at the trading price of a
stock on the day it is issued, then
no expense is recorded. For exam-
ple, a company whose stock was
trading at $10 would issue options
with strike prices of $10 on that day so
as to avoid the expense. Because of
this, virtually all employee options
issued after 1972 were “at the money,”
or with identical exercise and trading
prices on the day they were issued.
Another way to view it is that firms
were essentially allowed to ignore the
cost of employee stock options.
In 1995, as option grants grew more
popular, the FASB issued a new rule
that firms must also, at the very least,
report the “fair value” of employee
options in footnotes to their regula-
tory filings. (The FASB had wanted
this information to appear in the main
income statement, but firms lobbied
to prevent this from happening.) Fair
value is calculated by using formulas
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The price that the firm
would fetch in the market
for this asset would be its
economic value. Anything
less, and shareholders
arguably are being ill-served.
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granted options which will vest and
the expected volatility of the firm’s
stock price until the exercise date,
among other factors that are impossi-
ble to nail down with precision.
“Fair value” aims to derive the
underlying economic value of granting
options. Unlike an accounting valua-
tion, an economic valuation seeks to
reflect the “opportunity cost” of a
firm’s decision about how to deploy its
assets. In the case of a stock option,
the relevant question is: What else
could be done with it? Afirm could sell
it to an outside investor, for example.
The price that the firm would fetch in
the market for this asset would be its
economic value. Anything less, and
shareholders arguably are being ill-
served.
Consider the easiest way that firms
could account for stock options —
they could buy them from third par-
ties and then give them to employees.
True, this would trigger an upfront,
one-time expense. As Robert Bliss, a
former senior economist with the
Chicago Fed now at Wake Forest
University put it: “That this form of
employee stock option is not widely
adopted reveals something of the
motive behind their current usage —
to transfer value to the employee 
without the appearance of an actual 
expenditure.”
Wayne Guay, an accounting profes-
sor at the University of Pennsylvania,
acknowledges that valuing employee
options is tricky. But that’s the nature
of accounting, he says. Placing a dollar
value on things like “goodwill” and
pension plans likewise is fraught with
assumptions and possible imprecise-
ness. Moreover, just about every single
number in a financial statement is an
estimate, from cash on hand to inven-
tory. “Of the list of things that are
currently reflected in the income
statement, valuing employee stock
options does not strike me as one of
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Internet search and information firm Google recently intro-
duced a novel kind of stock option, one that employees can sell
to outside investors. Historically, most employee stock options
have been nontransferable, though firms like Microsoft have in
the past offered one-time programs for employees to sell
options.
Google’s plan is thought of as the first to be rolled out on
an ongoing basis, with a regular market in which financial
institutions and other investors can offer to buy employee
options. The company pitched the idea as a way to increase
the value of employee stock options — or at least the value
that employees place on them. The higher perceived value of
“sellable” employee options results from the fact that employ-
ees nowadays tend to exercise their options almost
immediately after they vest. (Google had its initial public
offering in 2004, and since then many of its
employee options have vested and been exer-
cised.) But profits from options in many cases
would have been greater if the employee had
waited for the firm’s stock price to rise. By sell-
ing vested options to optimization-minded investors and
financial institutions instead of exercising immediately,
employees are likely to pocket bigger profits.
The program “makes the value of [employee] options more
tangible,” said Allan Brown, director of Recognition and HR
Systems on Google’s blog. “By showing employees what finan-
cial institutions are willing to pay for their options, it is made
clear that the value of their options is greater than just the
intrinsic value.” (By intrinsic value, Brown meant the differ-
ence between the exercise price and the current market price.)
Google’s plan is an example of how many firms continue to
believe in the power of stock options, even as expensing them
has made more apparent the economic cost of issuing them. In
fact, Google predicts that its cost of issuing options will rise
with the plan because it will increase the expected life of the
options. The plan will convert all post-IPO options to trans-
ferable ones, along with all newly issued options. It is to go into
effect in the spring of 2007 and will not be available to senior
executives. Google says it awards options to all new employees
and then annually to many others.
Google’s timing in introducing transferable options has
ties to the new requirement of stock option expensing.
Google said that one of its aims was to close the gap between
the amount of stock option expense that the company has to
subtract from earnings and the amount which employees 
perceive their options are worth. The amount that has to be
deducted from earnings is based on options-pricing formulas,
with Google using the standard Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM)
pricing model.
In a statement about accounting for transferable options,
Google explained: “Because traditional employee
stock options are not transferable, there is a 
disconnect between their value as determined
using BSM — which, under the new accounting
rules, we recognize as stock-based compensa-
tion as the options vest — and the value employees ascribe to
their options on the date of grant. The [transferable stock
option] program diminishes this disconnect.”
Carl Luft, a finance professor at DePaul University who has
studied stock options, says that Google’s effort means it’s pos-
sible that market-determined prices for employee options will
someday be the way that firms value such options in their
financial statements. This would help end the debate over the
best way to value options and complaints that current formu-
las are imprecise, even though the prices are likely to come out
pretty close to each other. “My guess is that the market price
will converge with one of the theoretical pricing models pret-
ty quick,” Luft says. “And that will provide a hard number that
can be used in reporting rather than the number that is sub-
ject to criticism.” — DOUG CAMPBELL
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rently estimate,” Guay says.
Still, managers complain more
about valuing options than other
items. They note that although it 
usually takes at least several years for
employees to see any economic gain —
and gains may never materialize at all
— firms have to begin expensing the
options immediately. Likewise, they
argue that valuations are at best 
estimates. What’s more, the formulas
used for valuing employee options
were originally developed for 
standard-issue options. The difference
is important because employees tend
to exercise options immediately after
they’re vested, even if they are not
optimally priced at that time, which 
is contrary to what the standard 
formulas say they should do.
In addition, some firms dispute 
the very necessity of expensing
options. They point out that granting
options doesn’t affect cash flows, the
fundamental measure by which 
shares are valued. Also, small and
young firms in particular claim that
expensing options will make their
reported earnings lower, which in turn
would raise their cost of financing,
perhaps then choking off future
investment and innovation.
In a 2004 paper, economists 
R. Glenn Hubbard and Charles
Calomiris of Columbia University
argued that “the noise produced in
accounting earnings by the decisions
by the [Financial Accounting
Standards Board] about ‘true earnings’
are ill-advised.” Better, Hubbard and
Calomiris said, would be to leave the
valuation of options to Wall Street
professionals, whose sophisticated,
informed analyses play a central role in
setting stock prices at the margin.
Yes, Hubbard and Calomiris agree,
options represent a bona fide expense
that needs to be disclosed. But the
myriad different ways that they can be
valued mean that investors may end up
not comparing apples to apples when
looking at numbers across different
companies. “The primary role for 
regulation should be in the area of 
disclosure, which will ensure that
competing approaches to measuring
option costs are based on the same
basic information,” Hubbard and
Calomiris wrote.
Moreover, the evidence suggests
that the footnoted valuations are 
actually quite effective and informative.
A number of studies have concluded
that the market properly takes notice of
these footnotes and assigns market 
values accordingly. Summing up the
economic argument against an official
expensing of options, Cleveland Fed
economist Joseph Haubrich said: “Why
should it matter if this information 
is reported on one line rather than
another? Put differently, if the market
already values these options, there
would be little benefit to counting 
them as an expense.”
Pushback
Haubrich actually is more agnostic
about how to deal with stock options
than his quote implies. He notes 
that former Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan was a moderate 
proponent of expensing options, in
part because he was doubtful that 
markets actually do fully see their true
costs. What’s more, even if the market
cannot be fooled by stock options,
there is ample evidence that boards
and managers can.
Consider the voluminous com-
ments the standards board received
from corporations in advance of
adopting the expensing rule. “We con-
tinue to believe that, because no
corporate assets have been consumed
nor liabilities created, the issuance of a
stock option conceptually does not
result in an expense to the corpora-
tion,” said Rajeev Bhalla, former
controller for Bethesda, Md.-based
Lockheed Martin. Or reflect on the
words of Billie Rawot of Cleveland-
based Eaton Corp.: “Employee stock
options do not represent an expense
to the company that should be record-
ed in the income statement.”
Though not all firms denied the
very existence of a “cost” in issuing
employee stock options, many argued
in letters to the standards board that
the new rule greatly overstated their
expense. This complaint was at the
heart of doomsday scenarios raised by
the likes of Christine Copple of
Washington, D.C.-based ASM
Resources: “The most talented scien-
tists and researchers are much more
likely to depart the United States for
other nations. We must maintain our
competitive edge in attracting the
world’s top scientists.” In other words,
Copple was saying that ASM would
have to pare back on its option grants
if it had to expense them — even
though it was already doing so in the
footnotes.
As a result of these kinds of 
perceptions, U.S. firms were nearly
unanimous in their support of main-
taining the status quo of keeping
option expenses in footnotes. But 
did this make sense? How could 
firms simultaneously argue that 
a) footnotes provide adequate infor-
mation about stock option expenses
and b) incorporating this same infor-
mation into their main income
statements would be harmful? As
economist Haubrich notes, “Only if,
for some reason, the government both
wants to subsidize ... firms and finds
that the cheapest way to do so is to
ignore the option expense, does this
story make sense.”
Perhaps something else is 
going on. To understand what, 
RF Micro Devices serves as a useful
illustration.
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From almost the moment it was
founded, RF Micro Devices relied on
stock options as a major part of its
compensation program. Like at a lot
of young, high-tech firms, RF Micro’s
leadership reasoned that the upside to
investing in the company was large.
Meanwhile, cash on hand was small.
Granting options provided employees
with the promise of a big future pay-
off, while costing little in terms of
impact on the income statement —
thanks to accounting conventions of
the day. 
In RF Micro’s fiscal 2000, sub-
tracting the cost of employee stock
options from earnings (along with a
few other adjustments) would have
dropped profits 36 percent, from $50
million to about $32 million. Dean
Priddy, RF Micro Devices’ chief finan-
cial officer and the fifth employee to
be hired at the firm, in an interview
did not specifically address whether all
those options would have been grant-
ed if they had to be expensed. But he
did say: “I see why some management
teams would like it to be more of a
footnote.”
In 1998, the adjusted price of RF
Micro shares was just more than $1.
By early 2000, it was topping $90.
Options outstanding during 2000,
meanwhile, had exercise prices rang-
ing between 4 cents and $175, with a
weighted average strike price of
$17.22.  For a couple of years, employ-
ees holding options to buy RF Micro
stock were on the brink of striking it
rich. “If [the stock price] appreciates,
then the investor is going to be happy.
And the employee, too, is going to
draw some economic benefit,” 
Priddy says.
Then in the winter of 2000, RF
Micro shares began to plunge, follow-
ing the general southward trend of
the technology sector. With shares
quickly dipping to about $5, almost
all the outstanding options granted to
employees became worthless. And
RF Micro stock remained mired
south of $10 a share for the next few
years. With the 2006 adoption of the
new accounting rule regarding
expensing options, those worthless
options would suddenly be costing
RF Micro a chunk of profits.
For that reason, RF Micro in 2005
was one of about 900 firms nation-
wide that accelerated its stock option
vesting schedule. By speeding up the
vesting period, firms essentially erased
them off the books so that they 
wouldn’t need to expense them in
their income statements when the
time came. There was nothing neces-
sarily sinister about the practice,
although for firms that intend to keep
on using employee stock options — or
substitute some other sort of compen-
sation in lieu of options — it may
mean that reported 2005 expenses
appear abnormally low and likely to
jump up the following year.
In RF Micro’s case, all of the accel-
erated-vesting options were “out of
the money,” meaning the exercise
price was below the trading price 
at the time. The company vested 
10.2 million shares, and in its fiscal
2005 annual report said the move cost
it $22.1 million. But again, this charge
appeared only in the footnotes,
instead of in the main report if they
had carried over to the next year.
“That was a legitimate way to avoid
the expense on those particular
options,” says Priddy. “We decided it
would be a prudent thing to do.”
One earnings bullet was dodged,
but the new accounting rule loomed.
How would RF Micro Devices
respond? First, it has begun duly
reporting its options expenses in the
regular income statement. But it also
began doing something else — provid-
ing its own version of how investors
might view the firm’s financial reports.
It’s called “non-GAAP” results. GAAP
stands for Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles, and the non-
GAAP numbers take out expenses for
stock options, as well as some one-
time charges. For the firm’s second
quarter this year, the GAAP results
showed a loss of $20 million while the
non-GAAP results showed a profit of
$23.7 million.
“To the extent that [stock-option
expense] are in the GAAP results, it
does stand out,” Priddy says. “We’re
less concerned about where it shows
up than being able to show the invest-
ment community what we believe our
core operating results are. That gets to
the non-GAAP presentation.”
Broad-Based Options
Whether RF Micro Devices provides
two versions of financial results or 200
ultimately doesn’t matter. The impor-
tant thing is that a) the market gets the
information it needs to properly value
the firm and b) the firm’s managers
and board members recognize the true
economic cost of granting options as
they go about making decisions about
how to deploy the company’s assets.
The problem with stock options cen-
ters more on the latter point.
Kevin Murphy, an economist at the
University of Southern California
(USC), believes that scores of firms
had a blind spot with regards to
options, thanks in part to their previ-
ous disclosure location in the
footnotes, and he has evidence to back
that assertion up.
Murphy, along with Harvard
University economist Brian Hall,
found an enormous spike in the value
of option grants during the 1990s. In
1992, the average grant-date value of
employee stock options among firms
in the S&P 500 was $22 million; by
2000, it was $238 million. But the big
story in that growth was who was
receiving the options — rank-and-file
employees. By 2002, about 90 percent
of stock options were granted to
employees below the top-executive
level.
The thing is, the utility of options
among such lower-level employees is
limited. Options would seem useful in
attracting entrepreneurial, risk-taking
workers. But usually only the 
performance of employees with a lot of
responsibility and decisionmaking
opportunities can directly affect com-
pany stock prices. When options are so
liberally given, they can create a free-
rider problem, with many employees
benefiting from stock price gains that
occurred largely because of the actions
of others. Also, as a retention tool,
20 Region Focus • Winter 2007
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markets, as employees ditch their firms
in search of companies offering other
compensation packages.
Therein lies the big question:
Taking for granted that all of these
problems with granting options to
lower- and mid-level employees are
true, what reason would rational,
incentive-minded boards and man-
agers have in lavishing options across
the payroll? The only plausible answer
is that they regard them as free, or at
least as costing less than cash.
“The conclusion that these ... firms
will be hurt [by the new rule requiring
expensing of options] and not 
benefited is based on the incorrect
assumption that these options are
free, or cost very little,” Murphy says.
“But there’s an inherent fallacy in 
that logic. My own view is that 
companies are always helped when
they make decisions based on the 
economic cost.”
How is it that boards and managers
don’t seem to recognize the economic
costs of options while the market
does? The leading hypothesis is that
managers don’t pay attention to 
economic numbers because their 
compensation is based on accounting
numbers. Equally, managers perceive
that hitting their accounting number
targets is key to keeping their stock
prices steady and rising. “There’s a lot
of literature out there that seems to
suggest that managers care a whole lot
about accounting treatments for 
various types of things even though
the market sees through it,” says
Guay, the University of Pennsylvania
accounting professor. “This whole
notion of meeting or beating forecasts
has evolved into this complex game of
signaling that didn’t evolve out of any
economic significance.”
Economists Hall and Murphy have
looked beyond stock options and
found other evidence that managers
often respond to accounting concerns
in ways that seem irrational, citing 
the 1993 rule change imposing a
charge for anticipated post-retire-
ment health care liabilities. Firms
predicted that stock prices would fall
because of the impact on income, but
prices remained the same because the
market was already valuing this 
economic liability — and yet compa-
nies still cut back on their retiree
medical benefits. Such seeming 
irrationality remains hard to explain,
but it’s worth noting that, despite
such cases, firms generally behave in
ways that are consistent with main-
stream economic theory.  
Backdating
The historical practice of making
options essentially free in accounting
terms may be at the heart of one of 
the more recent scandals engulfing
corporate America — options back-
dating.
Backdating is the term given to the
practice of retroactively matching
strike prices of stock options so that
they correspond to a particularly low
price for the company’s stock. The
result is that employees with back-
dated options have greater
opportunity to enhance their profit
from exercising them. Backdating is
not necessarily illegal, so long as 
shareholders are properly informed
and earnings are properly adjusted —
but in practice few firms seem to have
met those requirements.
The vast majority of firms that
have announced they expect to re-
state earnings to reflect backdating of
options are in the technology 
sector, many based in Silicon Valley.
Among the more than 100 of those
firms is only one in the Fifth District
— ePlus Inc., a computer products
reseller based in Herndon, Va.,
according to a Wall Street Journal 
compilation of reports on firms that
have disclosed government investiga-
tions. The company in August said 
it would have to account for $3 mil-
lion in stock option compensation
expenses from April 1997 through
March 31, 2006, and that further
expenses arising from an internal
investigation “will be significant.”
Erik Lie, a finance professor at the
University of Iowa, is one of the lead-
ing researchers of the backdating
phenomenon. Lie estimates that at
least 2,000 firms have engaged in
backdating over the years.
Backdating is much less likely to
happen today for two reasons. The
first is due to a 2002 requirement 
by the SEC that option grants be
reported within two business days.
Firms that want to dabble in back-
dating today have to engage in
outright fraud rather than play around
the edges of legality as before. “Now
you have to come up with one more lie
about how you made the grant,” 
Winter 2007 • Region Focus 21
“The concept behind using stock options is
that it aligns employees’ interests with those
of our shareholders. As they work to increase
the value of the firm, employees in turn are
rewarded with the growing value of their
stock option grants.”
—LINDA BREWTON, MANAGER, 
INVESTOR RELATIONS, RED HAT INC., DURHAM, N.C.
“Stock options align well with Sonoco’s share-
holder interests and provide a good vehicle
for employee stock ownership, and until
recently had an advantageous accounting
treatment ... With the anticipation of FAS
No. 123(R) several years ago, Sonoco began to
shift more of its incentives at the senior level
from stock options to long-term incentive
plans based on restricted stock.”
—ROGER SCHRUM, DIRECTOR, 
CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS, SONOCO PRODUCTS CO.,
HARTSVILLE, S.C.
Since the adoption of FAS No. 123(R), “The
substantial majority of employees receiving
awards have received restricted stock instead
of stock options.”
—KATHARINE KENNY, ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT, 
INVESTOR RELATIONS, CARMAX INC., RICHMOND, VA.
“We are very concerned that the cost of
expensing employee stock options would
restrict the ability of companies to offer this
important benefit in the future ... In addition,
we are concerned with the impact the 
proposal would have on small businesses.”
—STEVEN ANDERSON, CEO, 
NATIONAL RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Views on Stock Options and
Reaction to FAS No. 123(R) from
Around the Fifth District
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dating.”
Second, some analysts argue that
expensing options serves as a deter-
rent to backdating. If firms had to
immediately recognize the cost of
granting options, then there likely
would have been more scrutiny over
the practice of backdating and 
its accompanying costs. Rebecca
McEnally, a director with the CFA
Institute, a Charlottesville, Va.-based
nonprofit financial markets organiza-
tion, says the requirement that firms
expense options is one of several
important changes that will ease the
problem. “Both preparers of financial
statements and auditors pay too little
attention to the numbers that are
reported in the footnotes,” McEnally
says. “If it’s not expensed, it looks like
a free good at the time, even though it
is costly to investors.”
Future Options
But what place will garden-variety
employee stock options hold in the
future? The evidence so far is that
companies are paring back their
employee option grants. Murphy, the
USC economist, says his recent sur-
veys have found that while in 2001,
firms were granting 2.6 percent of
their compensation in the form of
stock options, in 2005 it was down to
1.3 percent. “There’s a tremendous
amount of evidence that managers
and directors respond to changes in
accounting rules,” Murphy says.
In other words, now that there is
both an economic and accounting cost
to be reported, employee stock options
seem unlikely to be offered in the vol-
ume they were in years past. When it
became obvious that stock option
expensing would become the norm,
many firms began cutting back on their
use. Perhaps the most famous firm to
swear off options is Microsoft. Since
2003, the Redmond, Wash., company
has only made outright stock grants to
workers. In firms where stock options
continue to be issued, Murphy and
Hall believe, they are “likely to be
reduced and concentrated among
those executives and key technical
employees who can plausibly affect
company stock prices.” That category
would include young and small firms, as
well as possibly struggling firms for
which employee loyalty and high per-
formance is particularly important.
Of course, for firms that believe
stock prices already reflected the cost
of options, then reporting them
should not matter much, says the
Cleveland Fed’s Haubrich. “So if
options are the proper compensation
tool, their use should continue.” 
In Greensboro, RF Micro Devices
remains a believer in stock options.
Last year, the firm’s shareholders
approved a plan that canceled 9.4 mil-
lion old options and awarded half 
as many new ones. The old options
were worthless, with strike prices 
as high as $87.50 at a time when 
RF Micro shares were trading well
below $10. The newly issued shares
(one awarded for every two canceled
shares) came with much more friendly
exercise prices of $6.06 and vesting
over two years.
Thus, options remained a part of
RF Micro’s compensation program.
The firm continues to believe in the
utility of stock options, so much so
that to this day, every new domestic
employee at RF Micro Devices gets an
award of stock options upon hiring.
The firm has 2,000 domestic employ-
ees, so this is no trifling matter. It
speaks to management’s philosophy
about employee impact. As CFO
Priddy says, “We believe that every 
single employee has the ability to
improve the long-term operating
results for the company, whether it’s
someone working in wafer fabrication
to help improve the product, or if it’s a
person in customer service. To us, all
of our employees are valuable assets,
and we believe these employees recog-
nize the value of our stock options.”
In a way, one can think of RF Micro
Devices’ enduring faith in stock options
as a natural experiment: How much can
a firm rely on stock options to motivate
employees in a time when granting
them now carries immediate and per-
haps more obvious costs? Priddy is
optimistic. “It’s something we certainly
continue to plan on doing. I really don’t
know if this company as we know it
today would be here without stock
options,” he says. “That’s how powerful
an incentive tool I believe they are.”RF
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